According to Matthew Lipman, the community of philosophical inquiry can be understood as a social matrix generating a variety of social relationships and building up the framework of the cognitive matrices whose outcomes are cognitive relationships. From this perspective, the community, intended both as an existential as well as a social structure, is the ground for the emergence and development of complex thinking involving both critical, creative and caring cognitive processes. A community goes back to a pattern of relationships and interactions built on the recognition and acceptance of a cultural, ideological, religious or social reference with which the members of the group identify, and which represents the reason for them to form as a group. Communities generate relationships of commitment, sharing, and understanding that are the ground of caring thinking habits, but they are also the generative context of a process of continuous building/re-building/validation of shared meanings and sensibilities which is the ground for critical thinking. In a community context the dynamic between individual-individual and individual-community is both the expression and the management of conflict and opposition, and the construction of new existential, expressive and cognitive forms that allow for the emergence of thoughts capable of composition, integration, qualitative leaps, and surpassing and transcending phases therefore generating creative forms of thinking. As such, the community of philosophical inquiry represents a socio-relational matrix that is inseparably both epistemic and existential, and which reverberates along new links that build up between objects, between people, and within the world in a continuous circuit, and in which new senses and meanings are always being generated. For these reasons it can be extended to many other contexts other than those involving the teaching of complex thinking to children and adolescents, including a community development.

This review of Matthew Lipman’s autobiography, A Life Teaching Thinking, is a reflection on the themes and patterns of his extraordinarily productive career. His book begins with memories of earliest childhood and his preoccupation with the possibility of being able to fly, moves through the years in which his family struggled with the effects of the Great Depression, through his service in the military during World War II, his discovery of the joy and beauty of philosophy, his academic rise at Columbia University, his Fullbright sojourn in Paris, and his early and later career. Lipman’s educational project led in four related directions: the practice of philosophy for children, which he invented, and which presents an epistemological challenge to a second field, philosophy of education, which is as startling as was Rousseau’s two hundred years before. Third, it led to a realm of theory called philosophy of childhood, upon which the practice of philosophy for children is a kind of action-meditation, prompting adults as it does to reflect on children’s differences from and similarities to adults at the same time, and in the same discursive space. Finally, his praxis also implicitly challenged those accounts of children’s philosophies, paradigmatically represented by Piaget’s work, which represent childhood epistemology as evidence for various genetic and epigenetic stage-based theories of cognitive development. The consequence for education of this confluence was a methodology—community of inquiry—that serves as a bridge between the two most influential philosophers of education of the 20th century—John Dewey and Paulo Freire. The educational praxis that emerged from his venture, for all its apparent simplicity, operationalizes a postcolonial standpoint epistemology vis a vis childhood and children, pulls the linchpin that holds in place the school as ideological state apparatus, and empowers the elementary classroom as a primary site for democratic theory and practice.

This paper explores Matthew Lipman's notion of the philosophical text as model. I argue that Lipman's account of the philosophical text is one that brings together the expository and narrative textual forms in a distinctive way--not one in which the tension between the expository and the narrative is overcome once and for all, but in such a way that the expository and the narrative are brought into relationship within the very form of narrative itself. Drawing upon Michel Foucault's reading of Descartes "Meditations," I argue that Lipman's philosophical novels serve both a demonstrative and ascetic function, allowing us to situate Lipman's novels in the history of philosophical discourse, as well as point to the task of creating philosophical texts, and curriculum, in the future.

The influence of pragmatism—and of Dewey in particular—upon Lipman’s conception of the classroom Community of Inquiry is pervasive. The notion of the Community of Inquiry is directly attributable to Peirce, while Dewey maintained that inquiry should form the backbone of education in a democratic society, conceived of as an inquiring community. I explore the ways in which pragmatic conceptions of truth and meaning are embedded in the Community of Inquiry, as well as looking at its Deweyan moral and social commitments. I show that Peirce’s and Dewey’s notions of truth are in perfect alignment with the philosophical Community of Inquiry, as is Dewey’s tie between meaning and ideas that bring our inquiries to a satisfactory conclusion. The Deweyan notion that moral values are justified by their utility in solving problems in social life is also to be found in the Community of Inquiry, as arguably is his view that moral values are to be regarded as working values that face the tribunal of experience in much the same way as hypotheses in science. Again, the focus in the classroom on open inquiry into issues and problems, the active participation of the students in building upon one another’s ideas, the sense of shared responsibility, and the growth and development of the intellectual and social powers of the individual, all mirror Dewey’s pragmatic conception of democracy. Given this allegiance, it may be argued that the Community of Inquiry faces a pragmatic problem of its own. While it aims to be a philosophically open encounter with all kinds of issues and ideas, pragmatic conceptions are so constitutive of it that they may skew the pitch philosophically. I also address this issue.

How does one best stimulate among children and youth the nurturing of caring, higher order thinking, which Matthew Lipman extols and seeks to realize via his Philosophy for Children program? For Lipman, this is achieved principally through philosophical dialogue in a community of inquiry characterized not so much by participants’ shared quest to reach a fixed destination, but by a process guided by “procedural rules, which are largely logical in nature,” and which are imbued with “reasonableness, creativity, and care”. This, he believes, will best lead to the gaining of a deeper understanding of inquirers’ differing views that in turn enables them to accept and even embrace differences of opinion. Yet, I will contend in this paper, the type of process Lipman espouses, in which one allows an argument to be pursued wherever it happens to lead, must also be somewhat eschewed and supplanted with a discernible method on order to achieve the laudable ends Lipman has in mind, namely of enabling youth to “become more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate, more reasonable individuals”. To Lipman, an ipso facto outcome of dialogue of the sort he endorses is that as students become inured to asking each other for and seeking out reasons and opinions, they develop the capacity to listen carefully to each other and build upon and develop one another’s ideas; but I will make the case that this skill of careful listening, combined with the development of ideas, needs to be informed by a critical-sceptical method, if the ambitious and laudable democracy-enhancing aims of the Lipmanian Philosophy for Children program are to be optimally achieved.

This article argues that Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children Program is based on a liberal conception of the relationship between education and society--a conception from which the idealist and non-critical character of his pedagogy derives. In order to demonstrate this, a short characterization of this conception is initially presented, emphasizing the equalizing and “redeeming” social mission that it entrusts to the schools. Afterwards, it briefly describes some of the main aspects of Lipman’s program, then explains the way in which it incorporates the liberal doctrine of the “redeeming” school. Finally, it discusses some of the political and ideological implications that follow from this incorporation. It is important to clarify that the reflection here presented does not refer to any of the actual practices of philosophy with children, but to Lipman’s own position, which is developed in two of his most important works, Philosophy Goes to School and Thinking in Education.

Matthew Lipman wrote that “questioning is the leading edge of inquiry.” This reflects the primacy of the question in a community of philosophical inquiry. The heart of the transformative potential of philosophy for children is student engagement in a dialogue grounded in the questions that most appeal to the group and the collaborative attempt to construct meaning and cultivate deep understanding. The students’ responsibility for choosing the question to begin their discussion enhances the democratic nature of the community and highlights the preeminence within the inquiry of the issues that perplex the students. There is a significant relationship between having the children choose the question for discussion and the role of epistemological modesty – the acknowledgement that all members of the group, including the facilitator, are fallible and hold views that could end up being mistaken - in a community of philosophical inquiry. In order to encourage children to engage in what Lipman called “creative questioning,” it’s essential that we trust their judgment and support their cultivation of the inclination to question.

This paper explores the role that the idea of science plays within Matthew Lipman’s approach to inquiry. On the one hand it seems that Lipman shares a typically modern ‘antagonist-metascientific’ view of philosophy (in a quasi Arendtian-Kantian way) in opposing the scientific undertaking and philosophical inquiry. On the other hand, he models his idea of community of philosophical inquiry on the Peircean-Deweyan theoretical construct of community of inquiry which refers exactly to the scientific undertaking. And – what is still more significant – it is just by capitalizing on the “scientific” origin of the construct that Lipman can revive the Socratic tradition of philosophy as a dialogic practice. But Lipman’s relationship with science is still more complex: he identifies science as a project of “outfoxing and outguessing nature.” By tracing the origin of such metaphors to the Heraclitean dictum “nature loves to hide” (physis kryptesthai philei) and to Francis Bacon’s interpretation of ancient myths, and by contrasting them with the Kuhnian idea of normal science as puzzle-solving, it becomes clear that Lipman recognizes the “thoughtful”—that is, philosophical -- dimension of science, and the need for complex thinking within science itself as a basic dimension of its development. Against the backdrop of such analyses, the paper attempts to point to the possibility of a pedagogy of science in a Lipmanian vein.